Moral Behavior in Stock Markets: Islamic finance and socially responsible investment by Pitluck, Aaron Z.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Moral Behavior in Stock Markets:
Islamic finance and socially responsible
investment
Aaron Z. Pitluck
Illinois State University, Normal
15. March 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9477/
MPRA Paper No. 9477, posted 8. July 2008 00:51 UTC
 1 
Moral Behavior in Stock Markets: 
Islamic Finance and Socially Responsible Investment 
 
Aaron Z. Pitluck 
Illinois State University 
Campus Box 4660 
Normal, IL 61790-4660 
Aaron.Pitluck@ilstu.edu 
  
March 15, 2008 
 
 
Abstract 
 This paper addresses the puzzle of why the inclusion of non-financial social justice or 
religious criteria by professional fund managers has been so popular in Malaysia and yet has had 
to date relatively little influence in the United States stock market.  Drawing from over 125 
ethnographic interviews with financial workers in Malaysia, this paper argues that moral 
investment  behavior in stock markets is shaped primarily by ‘market structure’ rather than by 
‘mandates.’  In both countries mandates are a weak form of social control of fund manager’s 
behavior.  This is because mandates are not principal-agent contracts but are primarily marketing 
exercises and cultural tools.  Social investing in the United States is weak because it relies solely 
on mandates to communicate clients’ ethical desires to their fund managers.  Islamic and Ethical 
finance in Malaysia is strong because Islamic social movements have reformed the Malaysian 
stock market’s structure.  Specifically, a uniform interpretation of Islamic investing was 
institutionalized with the creation of a nearly-unique quasi-governmental body.  As a 
consequence, Islamic principles systematically influence the behavior of corporations listed in 
Malaysia, at present narrowly, but with the potential for wider influence in future. The paper 
closes with implications for social investment in the United States. 
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Would you feel uncomfortable financially supporting and profiting from a corporation 
that used sweatshop labor, produced products that were harmful to consumers, paid excessive 
compensation to its executives, or had recently violated environmental regulations in order to 
make a profit? Many people would feel uncomfortable. In a U.S. poll of households with 
investments in the stock market, one-third would like to incorporate moral criteria in their 
investment decisions and an additional third would consider it (MMA 2003: 11).1 The above 
social concerns were the top four of significance to United States investors in 2003 (MMA 
2003).2 We could consider these ‘harmful business practices’ since they include a corporation’s 
behavior vis-a-vis its employees, consumers and our environment (see Dolan and Werner, this 
volume).  
 Money management subject to moral, ethical, religious or some other non-financial 
constraint is known as Socially Responsible Investing (SRI). Yet in contrast to the one-third of 
investors who wish to incorporate ethical concerns in their investment behavior, the size of funds 
invested in the United States in SRI account for only $7.00 in every $100.00 invested with 
professional money managers, approximately $171 billion (Social Investment Forum 2006). 
Even more interestingly, in contrast to the ‘harmful business practices’ of concern to American 
investors, the top four prohibited investments of actually invested SRI dollars were (in declining 
size of funds) tobacco, alcohol, gambling, and defense/weapons—sin stocks and war (Social 
Investment Forum 2006).3  Thus we can observe a gap between individuals’ beliefs on moral 
investment behavior and the menu of ethical investment vehicles presently available and 
purchased in the market.4  Moreover with the weak exception of occasional shareholder 
resolutions, this sizable minority of SRI funds does not appear to have much of an influence over 
corporate behavior of U.S. listed corporations.5 
 In contrast to Socially Responsible Investing in the United States, in the Malaysian stock 
market there is a coherent and unified vision of ethical investment. As of December 2005, I 
estimate that the size of funds invested in ‘Islamic’ or ‘ethical’ investment accounts is 
approximately $15.00 in every $100.00 invested with professional money managers.6 Even more 
importantly, this investment behavior systematically influences Malaysian corporations’ 
behavior. 
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 The organization of the article is as follows. I begin by briefly describing popular social 
movements in both the United States and Malaysia that partially shaped peoples’ preferences to 
extend ethical or religious criteria to their investment behavior. I also distinguish “Islamic 
finance” from “conventional” finance and introduce a Malaysia-specific concept of “ethical 
finance.” I then make two arguments to explain the more powerful influence of morality on 
investment behavior (and by extension, on corporate behavior) in Malaysia as compared to the 
United States. The first is a bottom-up argument that focuses on professional money managers’ 
behavior. I argue that clients’ preferences and their “mandates” (to use the native term) in both 
the United States and Malaysia are relatively weak external constraints on fund managers’ 
behavior because they are socially constructed by the interaction between powerful money 
managers and their relatively less powerful clients. As a consequence, SRI in the United States 
has a weak influence because it relies on mandates. I then make a top-down argument that the 
Islamic capital market in Malaysia has been shaped by a powerful social movement with a 
coherent ideology and backed by powerful actors, namely the Malaysian government, that has 
altered the market’s structure by institutionalizing Islamic finance. When this institutionalization 
is combined with bottom-up social pressure on asset management firms to invest in conformance 
to Islamic principles, the combined social forces create a potentially powerful influence over 
corporations in Malaysia, regardless of the religion (if any) of their leadership. This article draws 
on over 125 tape-recorded semi-structured ethnographic interviews with financial workers in 
Malaysia in 2001-2002 (Pitluck 2005) and in 2006, particularly a subset of 22 interviews with 
current and six interviews with former money managers (whom I also refer to as fund managers), 
three members of the Syariah7 Advisory Council and three regulators at the Securities 
Commission. 
Note that this argument need not assume or claim that Malaysia’s stock market is 
unproblematic (see Gomez and Jomo 1999 for a sophisticated catalog of problems). Rather, this 
article seeks to explain the relatively greater prevalence of explicitly moral, non-financial 
investment behavior by professional money managers in the Malaysian stock exchange relative to 
that in the United States equities market. 
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U.S. and Malaysian Ethical Investment Social Movements   
Drawing on two decades of data from the World Values Survey, Inglehart and Welzel 
(2005) describe a global, uneven, and potentially reversible temporal shift in cultural values 
towards post-material values in countries with pervasive existential security. This shift in cultural 
values provides an opportunity for social movements and market entrepreneurs to promote the 
incorporation of non-financial criteria in financial markets (see Dolan and Garsten and Hernes, 
this volume). 
 Before describing how social movements have created a market for Islamic finance and 
Socially Responsible Investing, it may be helpful to define three forms of finance:  “Islamic,” 
“conventional,” and a Malaysia-specific “ethical” finance. Islamic finance, like other Islamic 
entrepreneurship, is largely (but not entirely) self-defined (Henry and Wilson 2004: 1-2) and 
differs from conventional financial institutions insofar as they base their objectives and 
operations on Islam (Warde 2000: 5). There are two important characteristics distinguishing 
Islamic finance from conventional finance. The first is that Islamic finance emphasizes a “risk-
sharing philosophy” in which fixed, predetermined interest rates are inferior to a profit-and-loss 
sharing agreement. The second is “the promotion of economic and social development through 
specific business practices and through zakat (almsgiving)” (Warde 2000: 5). However, as a 
leading scholar of Islamic finance acknowledges, “no definition of Islamic finance is entirely 
satisfactory” (Warde 2000: 5; see also Maurer 2002).   
  With a few exceptions, every country in the world with an Islamic Capital Market has in 
parallel a ‘conventional’ capital market and therefore there are few ‘Islamic’ stock exchanges.8 
Instead, there is a subset of corporations on each country’s stock exchange that could be 
considered ethical (Shariah-compliant) insofar as the corporations conform to Islamic principles.  
At present, whether a firm is considered ethical by Islamic criteria in global stock exchanges 
(including Malaysia and the United States) rests on four principles of corporate behavior (IOSCO 
2004: 5-9; Iqbal and Molyneux 2005: 4-17; Securities Commission 2005; Usmani 2002; Warde 
2000: 55-72): 
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 1. Prohibition of riba.  One may not profit from “fixed, predetermined aspects of 
interest-based lending” which is perceived as an unfair advantage lenders impose 
on borrowers (Warde 2004: 40). 
 2. Prohibition of gharar. Contracts should be transparent, minimize risk, and not 
seek to profit from uncertainty. 
 3. Prohibition of maysir. Related to gharar, one may not profit from gambling and 
games of chance, including pure speculation. 
 4. Corporations’ activities must be productive and must not primarily engage in 
‘haram’ activities forbidden by the religion such as producing liquor and 
gambling. The precise list of such activities may vary, reflecting the global reach 
and adaptability of the religion (see also Warde 2000: 41-42). 
Of course there is a great deal of potential interpretation of these principles in practice.  
Corporations are complex organizations frequently engaged in multiple activities. Like Domini 
(2001: 54) and other SRI advocates, Islamic finance seeks to set a “percentage limit of acceptable 
involvement in an unacceptable industry.” 
 In Malaysia, in addition to “Islamic” or “Syariah-compliant” investing, a second type of 
social investing called “ethical” investing has been adopted by government bodies and agencies 
such as the Employee Provident Fund. This simpler investment philosophy only prohibits 
investment in companies that are involved in alcohol or gambling. Some entities additionally 
prohibit investments in tobacco. 
 The operationalization of Islamic finance in Malaysia is a product of global and national 
social movements. Advocacy of contemporary Islamic Finance originated in the mid-1970s when 
there was firstly, a shift in political economic power from the global North to the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and secondly, the rise of pan-Islamism (Kahf 2004; 
Warde 2004, 2000: 73-112). Non-governmental Islamic banks were founded throughout the 
world in the 1970s as a consequence of social movement activism by Saudi Arabian leaders 
(principally King Faisal, Prince Mohammad Al-Faisal and Sheikh Saleh Kamel), social networks 
(the Dar al-Maal al-Islami Group and the Dallah al-Baraka Group), and Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) governments (IOSCO 2004: 19-20; Warde 2004, 2000: 73-112; Kahf 
2004). 
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 In Malaysia, the Islamic revival movement (popularly known as dakwah,  literally “to 
summon or call”), dates from the same years of Middle Eastern pan-Islamism and increased piety 
but originates with older, local concerns of Malay nationalism, religious-ethnic identities and 
post-Independence ethnic politics (see Chandra Muzaffar 1987; Shamsul 1997; Zainah Anwar 
1987). As documented by Shamsul (1997), the dakwah movement flourished first in the domestic 
universities, radicalized in overseas universities, and in the 1980s entered into government with 
the retrospective milestone of ex-Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim joining the government 
in 1982. As a continuation of the above domestic concerns, as well as a frequently pan-Islamic 
foreign policy dating from the 1970s, the Malaysian government promoted Islamic finance as 
well as numerous other Muslim institutions associated with economic development and cultural 
modernization (see Bank Negara 1999: 243-260; Securities Commission 2002: 7). 
 An additional motivation for promoting Islamic finance is that the Malaysian government 
estimates that $800 billion is owned by Muslims world-wide and that this may be potentially 
invested in global Islamic capital markets, including Malaysia (Securities Commission 2001: 
181-182).9 A symbol of the Malaysian government’s commitment to becoming a global “Islamic 
capital market centre” is that it was one of six “strategic initiatives” enshrined in the 
government’s touchstone, Malaysian Capital Market Masterplan (Securities Commission 2001: 
173-197). This goal was reiterated in the economy-wide Ninth Malaysia Plan, 2006-2010 
(Economic Planning Unit 2006: 184). 
 The market for Socially Responsible Investing in the United States has also arisen from 
social movements. Beginning in the 1960s, anti-Apartheid, civil rights, and consumer social 
movements targeted corporations and their investors to promote social justice and to improve 
consumer and environmental protection. In 1969, the Council on Economic Priorities began 
rating corporations on their social and environmental performance. In the 1970s the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center and Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility was founded.  
In the 1980s, U.S. anti-Apartheid social movements focused their energies on persuading 
universities, churches, and charitable endowments to disinvest from South Africa. As a product 
of these diverse social movements, in the early 1980s, entrepreneurs and activists created several 
religious-based and politically-based Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) funds (Domini 
2001). This financial services industry niche market has grown such that in 2006 the SRI sector 
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comprised approximately $171 billion, with over 7 per cent of funds invested with professional 
money managers (Social Investment Forum 2006). 
 
The Social Construction of Mandates  
To begin a bottom-up argument that examines how money managers incorporate moral 
decision-making in their investment and disinvestment decisions, and particularly how these 
choices are structured by social forces, including their clients, we must first address the generic 
question of how money managers make their speculative decisions. In this section I will argue 
that the social construction of “mandates” as practiced in both the United States and in Malaysia 
offers one explanation why Socially Responsible Investing in the United States—including 
religious-based criteria—is so infrequently conducted and so poorly mapped to investors’ stated 
preferences. 
 Money managers are like positivistic social scientists; they systematically gather 
information, create simplified descriptions of a dynamic and complex reality and then seek to 
make predictions based on this representation. These predictions are then operationalized into 
investment and disinvestment decisions (see also Brügger 2000). 
[INSERT Figure 1 HERE; found at end of manuscript]  
Figure 1 illustrates four social forces influencing money managers’ cognition and behavior. In the 
illustration, pictured on the left is the influence of the money managers’ clients and the client 
preferences in the form of a mandate.  On the right is market structure, that is the formal and 
informal regulations – as well as the degree of enforcement – of the stock exchange. Below is the 
very important structuring influence of the asset management firm that employs the money 
manager (e.g., Clark and Thrift 2005). And finally, above is the money manager’s social 
cognitive network – his or her community of co-thinkers and co-doers in the industry, composed 
of market analysts, brokers, and other fund managers. With the context of the discussion in this 
chapter, the most relevant social forces are those on the left and right; the independent effects of 
the money managers’ asset management firm and social networks, I have documented elsewhere 
(Pitluck 2005). The second section of this article focuses on market structure. 
 Typically the preeminent criteria by which a client gauges a money manager’s 
performance is how much money he or she makes for every dollar invested. When clients have 
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additional constraints that they wish to place on the fund managers, the native term for this in the 
international asset management industry is a “mandate.” The typical mandate describes the 
riskiness of the fund’s investments and/or the investment strategy that the money manager should 
pursue. As a product of the shifting cultural values and of campaigning by the ethical investment 
social movements described earlier, an increasingly popular mandate is a ‘social’ or ‘religious’ 
mandate that prohibits investments in specific lines of business. In the case of these ethical funds, 
the mandate specifies non-financial criteria that the client imposes on the money manager. 
Mandates are created and defined in each asset management firm and may be customized for 
particular clients. 
 Drawing on my interviews in Malaysia, as well as on the international financial press, I 
have identified three perspectives with which we can understand mandates, both financial and 
social: the economics, marketing, and cultural tool perspectives. The first is the economics 
perspective, which is closest to the dictionary definition of ‘mandate:’ a mandate is an 
“authoritative command,” “a formal order from a superior to an inferior,” and “an authorization 
to act” given to an agent (American Heritage Dictionary 2004). In principal-agent theory (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976) and in the rational choice literature, a mandate could be viewed as a social 
contract between a principal (the client investor) and the agent (money manager) he or she hires. 
According to this perspective, since client investors have diverse goals for investment, 
investment philosophies and tolerances for risk, these ‘mandate’ terms are intended to match 
appropriate fund types with particular types of investors. For example, risk-loving younger or 
wealthy individuals may prefer a fund with a risky aggressive investment strategy. Alternatively, 
a hospital’s pension fund may take an ethical stance by not investing in corporations that profit 
from alcohol or tobacco. In sum, in the economics perspective, a mandate is a constraining social 
contract binding the behavior of the money manager to the preference structure of the hiring 
principal. A client agrees to a mandate as an imposition of will on the behavior of the hired 
money manager. In interviews with financial workers, this is the most frequently voiced 
interpretation of mandates by fund managers: 
When you sell is up to you, although some funds have guidelines. 
[For example] one fund has a maximum of 20 per cent gain. If the 
fund mandates that you sell, you sell. 
 If a mandate is a social contract, as the economics perspective suggests, it is in practice a 
weak social contract. The mandates that U.S. clients are aware of – namely the names of the 
funds and their descriptions – have little correlation with the types of stocks that the funds in 
practice purchase. Consider the observations of a director of fund analysis and two financial 
journalists who observed mutual fund companies changing their fund’s names to reflect a “value” 
orientation following the end of the U.S. technology bubble in 2000: 
The portfolios remain much the same, but the names are changing at a rapid rate.  
Hundreds of U.S. mutual funds have altered their names this year to reflect the 
sober mood of the markets—“New Economy” and “Growth” are out, and “Value” 
is definitely in.  “Investment companies are ripping names from the headlines and 
slapping them on funds that haven’t changed a bit,” said Russ Kinnel, director of 
fund analysis at Morningstar, which tracks the performance of mutual funds.  
(cited in Cooper et al. 2003: 2) 
 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires that merely 80 per cent of 
a fund’s assets need to be invested “in the type of investment suggested by its name,” (O’Brian 
2001; Securities and Exchange Commission 2004). Such a standard is rather weak; consider the 
effect on a risk-averse fund if up to 20 per cent of its assets are invested in extremely risky 
investments. For example, in July 2001, Alliance Capital North American Government Income 
Trust, whose nominal mandate was investing in nearly risk-free U.S. debt, held 17.4 per cent of 
its portfolio in extremely risky Argentine government debt (O’Brian 2001). In December, such 
risk was tragically transformed into certainty when Argentina’s economy collapsed and the 
government announced it would not pay its foreign creditors. A further illustrative example can 
be seen in the prospectus of the American Century Heritage Fund (2006) which claims to 
constrain itself “to invest the fund’s assets primarily in U.S. stocks.” At the beginning of 2005, it 
held 93 per cent of its funds in U.S. stocks. During 2005, the American Century Heritage Fund 
began investing overseas and by early 2006 it held only 76 per cent of its funds in American 
stocks. This shift to a strategy contrary to their mandate was not mentioned in shareholder 
reports. These are not atypical cases. According to Morningstar, Inc., an independent market 
research corporation, over 100 mutual funds that were classified by Morningstar as “U.S. stock 
funds” held over 20 per cent of their portfolios in non-U.S. securities in February 2006 
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(Lauricella 2006). Given the discrepancy between mandates and the actual investments U.S. 
money managers make, it appears that mandates act as only a weak constraint on shaping fund 
managers’ behavior. While I do not have similar statistical evidence from Malaysia, anecdotal 
comments by Malaysian interviewees suggest that mandates can be a similarly weak constraint 
on Malaysian money managers’ behavior. Two interviewees with mandates for investing in small 
and medium-size corporations explained that in practice they do not invest substantially in such 
corporations. Similarly, a large and diverse number of interviewees participated in or witnessed 
out-of-mandate investments during the “Super Bull Run” prior to the Asian Financial Crisis of 
1997-98. 
 In both the United States and Malaysia, mandates are only strong constraints on 
professional fund managers’ behavior if they are carefully defined by the stock market’s 
regulatory authority or are strictly defined and monitored by the asset management firm itself. In 
both countries, few mandate terms are defined by the national regulator. In the U.S., the SEC has 
no official definition of most mandate terms, including such self-evident adjectives relating to a 
corporation’s size such as “small cap,” “mid-cap” and “large cap.” More ambiguous terms like 
“ethical,” “green,” “Christian,” “value” and “growth” – terms that reflect broad and contested 
ethical values or investment strategies – are similarly not defined by the SEC regulation (Cooper 
et al. 2003; O’Brian 2001). As long as an asset management firm does not define these terms in 
its prospectus, a “value” fund can legally invest entirely in “growth” corporations.   
 An alternative perspective of mandates is the marketing perspective; mandates are a 
brand, or marketing exercise, or story. Asset management firms design mandates in order to 
attract investors who associate with the brand. Likewise, clients choose money managers not only 
for their expertise, but also based on a social relationship of trust. This trust is facilitated when 
mandates mirror the clients’ identity, affinities, or tells a story that the client can literally buy into 
by placing money in the fund. In the same way that laundry soap brands seek to market 
themselves as unique, despite selling nearly identical products, asset management firms may 
advertise themselves as an “Islamic fund,” “ethical fund,” “technology fund,” “small-company 
growth fund,” or another niche identity. Such clustering of small numbers of firms into partially 
monopolized niche markets based on identity is pervasive in economic markets (White 2002), 
and in the asset management market, where ‘quality’ is so elusive and uncertainty so high 
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(O’Barr and Conley 1992a; Podolny 1993), niche market names may be particularly useful 
symbolic signals of quality and identity (Lounsbury and Rao 2004). Ethnographies (O’Barr and 
Conley 1992a, 1992b), interviews and analyses of university endowment funds and public 
pension funds’ trading behavior (Lakonishok et al. 1992; Shefrin 2000: 213-224), as well as one 
of my interviews with a director on a Malaysian investment committee, all suggest that a niche 
identity can contribute to attracting and retaining investors’ money. These studies suggest that 
clients are attracted to asset management funds that market themselves as active traders with a 
distinctive niche mandate. Asset management firms can gain clients and therefore revenue by 
marketing multiple mandate niches independent of their actual investment behavior.  In sum, 
according to the marketing perspective, a mandate is like a ‘brand’ such as Coca-Cola; the 
ingredients of Coca-Cola no longer contain coca leaf or perhaps even kola nut (Pendergrast 1993) 
but the inaccurate brand name remains and continues to serve as a useful marketing tool. 
Client Management and the Social Construction of Mandates and Benchmarks  
   In my perspective, a mandate is a more complex and flexible tool than either the 
economic or marketing perspectives suggest. A mandate is a cultural tool that assists a fund 
manager with interpreting her or his speculations of the future and arriving at a decision. 
Mandates also provide meaning to fund managers, since they can assist these players in justifying 
their behavior to their boss or their client by referring to their mandate. The mandate is therefore 
also a means of communication between the fund manager and those with whom she or he needs 
to communicate, including clients and co-workers. As a result, a mandate is like a code or a 
blueprint that provides fund managers with a template for how to invest (Griswold 1987). 
 Even financially sophisticated clients have a single, preeminent, implicit mandate that is 
to receive high rates of return for their investment; they want to make money. More specifically, 
they want their fund’s performance to outperform benchmarks associated with that fund’s 
mandate. Money managers prefer a narrower mandate and therefore shape their clients’ 
preferences. I argue that money managers’ clients’ preferences are endogenous and are 
predominantly constructed in their social interactions with money managers. This includes the 
operationalization of clients’ ethical preferences into guidelines for ethical investment. In these 
interactions, money managers are in a more powerful position vis-a-vis their clients and shape 
their clients’ preferences and perceptions to their advantage. As a consequence, money managers 
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and asset management firms shape mandates to fit their professional and organizational needs, 
except insofar as the mandate is a credible marketing exercise. 
 I had previously described that mandate terms’ precise definitions vary between the asset 
management firms within which money managers work. In addition to this firm-level variance, 
however, there is also considerable leeway for the interpretation of the mandate and it is part of 
the money managers’ job to perform this task. For example, in the interview below, Puan 
Aysha,10 a Malaysian fund manager of Islamic and ethical funds, explains that “[m]andates are 
broad, but you make them specific.”  In the following excerpt, Puan Aysha provides a stylized 
example of an interaction she would have with a client while opening a new account. 
Aysha: Mandates are kind of broad, but you make it specific. Usually [the client gives] you a 
broad mandate, like, okay, ‘We are a government agency retirement fund.  Maybe we 
want stable income or something like that.’  So when you draft up the agreement, you 
try to be specific. Because you don’t want [the mandate] to be very broad because it 
will be difficult for you to manage. So you put in some kind of suggestion.  ‘Do you 
want it to be ethical or something like that?’ And they say, ‘Okay, yeah, fine.’  So you 
just take that one.  ‘Will you allow us to invest overseas?’ . . . So you have to put in 
those guidelines and ask them. ‘Do you allow us to buy Second Board stocks?’ ‘Do you 
allow us to buy non-trustee stocks?’ 
Pitluck: (...) When you say ‘non-trustee’ ones, what do you mean by that? 
Aysha: We classify trustee... [Voice trailing.] I think that is a grey area, also, how you define 
trustee status. There’s no such proper definition for that.  But the most commonly used 
is that the stock must declare dividends for five years after listing.  Of course there are 
exceptions to that.  But that’s the most widely used one. So if you have clients with very 
long-term objectives, I’m sure they would want companies that can declare dividends 
for them. So most—I’m not saying all—but most of the clients with long-term 
objectives require you to have either 100%, or a certain percentage in trustee stocks. 
They would give you maybe 70 per cent or 50 per cent or 100 per cent. 
In this narrative, note that the fund manager sought to narrow a broad investment objective – 
“stable income” – with specific categories of stocks allowable on the buy list (e.g., “Do you 
allow us to buy non-trustee stocks?”) in her ideal-typical conversation with her client. And yet 
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the terminology – for example “trustee stocks”– is not specific enough to actually constrain a 
fund manager’s strategies (with exceptions detailed in the next section). A 70 per cent threshold 
may be specific, and may in practice be a strict bright-line regulation for the asset management 
firm’s employees. But this ‘hard’ constraint is ‘soft’ if the definition of whether the corporation 
is a ‘trustee stock’ is malleable and is partly a function of changing contextual factors such as its 
behavior relative to other corporations. 
 In Malaysian (Securities Commission 2005) and U.S. securities legislation (Langevoort 
1996) such a conversation between Puan Aysha and her clients is legally necessary and the fund 
manager is legally bound to know the financial circumstances and objectives of the client.  
Because such client preferences are simultaneously created and shaped by the fund manager’s 
conversation with the client, I refer to these preferences as “endogenous,” that is, they are shaped 
by the process that reveals them. 
 The need for interpreting investment objectives for clients is particularly important when 
the broad mandate is not specified when the account is first opened. Another fund manager of 
Islamic funds, Hassan, described how this was rarely done for public sector client investors in the 
recent past: 
If you look at the fund management agreements, only now do you 
see objectives being stated, time horizons, benchmarks, etc.  
Previously there was no agreement. They just give you the money, 
and they expect you to make more money for them. . . . So when I 
took over [the account two years ago], the first thing I had to do 
was to actually try and figure out who are these people.  Who are 
these institutions. What should be their required returns. Their risk 
tolerances. So that was the first thing.  The second thing, then, 
would be, to restructure their portfolios to meet these objectives. 
This was particularly true for the recent past when Malaysian federal and state government 
ministries were first beginning to invest their funds in the stock market. As Hassan described it, 
“It was like the blind leading the blind,” since the early fund managers were typically accountants 
teaching themselves how to be fund managers. 
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 Even a client’s interpretation of the monthly, quarterly and annual reports of their fund’s 
performance (and that of their fund manager) is shaped by interactions with their fund manager.11 
This is because, firstly, even professional clients require money managers to interpret 
performance relative to a benchmark given the shifting macroeconomic context in which these 
investments are made (O’Barr and Conley 1992a: 172; Sheffrin 2000: 217). In addition, a fund’s 
observable performance can be reinterpreted by referring to the unobservable risk absorbed or 
avoided (see also Beck 1992).12 Secondly, fund performance is interpreted relative to a 
benchmark and money managers typically have a great deal of power in suggesting these 
benchmarks and in interpreting them, thereby allowing “obfuscation games” to the fund 
manager’s true performance (Sheffrin 2000: 159-174). Thirdly, there are high transaction costs 
involved in firing and replacing an external money manager (O’Barr and Conley 1992a) and 
often insufficient incentives to do so in mutual fund industries due to conflicts of interest (Bogle 
2005: 139-214). Finally, the problems of interpreting a money manager’s performance and the 
choice of a performance benchmark is exacerbated when funds have non-financial goals and/or 
constraints, as is the case in Islamic Finance and SRI. 
 When performance is below expectations, the conversation continues in operationalizing 
the client’s wishes into an investment strategy. As Hassan explained, “They [his clients] don’t 
really understand, they don’t really know what they themselves want. So basically it is up to me 
to impose it on them.” Half an hour later in the interview, he stresses that without such cognitive 
management of his clients, they have “unrealistic expectations” of what is financially possible, 
and what risks are involved. Thus, not only are clients’ preferences endogenous, but their 
ongoing expectations and interpretations of the funds’ performance are as well. 
 Multiple studies in the United States have made similar observations regarding the 
asymmetrical relationship between money managers and bureaucratic clients, including civil 
servants, corporate treasury departments, and even financial corporations’ Investment 
Committees (Sheffrin 2000: 213-224; see also Langevoort 1996; Lakonishok et al. 1992; O’Barr 
and Conley 1992a, 1992b). In sum, money managers have considerable power to shape even 
sophisticated and powerful client investors’ endogenous preferences. 
 What becomes evident in this section is that the social construction of mandates as 
practiced in both the United States and Malaysia offers one explanation for why Socially 
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Responsible Investing (SRI) in the United States is so infrequently conducted and so poorly 
mapped to investors’ stated preferences. I argue that mandates are a particularly weak constraint 
on money managers’ behavior relative to the other social forces listed in Figure 1 and therefore 
clients’ preferences are not translated into their money managers’ behavior. Mandates are 
socially constructed as a credible marketing exercise and by an unequal interaction between 
money managers and their clients. As a consequence, money managers and asset management 
firms use mandates as communication tools to lightly coordinate their investment strategies with 
the (malleable) endogenous preferences of clients. 
 In Malaysia, as in the United States, financial mandates appear to be a weak constraint on 
money managers’ behavior. However ethical investing in Malaysia, particularly Islamic finance, 
is treated as a strong constraint on money managers’ actions. In the following section, I argue that 
the success of Islamic Finance as a powerful influence on money managers’ and corporations’ 
behavior is not because of the proliferation of Islamic mandates, but rather because the Islamic 
finance social movement altered the nation’s market structure. 
 
The Political Economy of Market Structure in the Islamic Capital Market  
 In Malaysia, Islamic Finance’s morality has been operationalized in a constellation of 
social forces I categorize as ‘market structure,’ a far stronger influence on money managers’ 
behavior than firm-level and interaction-level mandates (recall Figure 1). Market structure 
includes self-enforcing regulations within the stock exchange, national financial regulation by 
national political bodies on all exchanges within their jurisdictions (e.g. the Securities 
Commission, the Central Bank, and the Ministry of Finance) and finally the degree of 
enforcement of such written regulations. Market structure also includes informal regulations and 
local market cultures (Abolafia 1996; Pitluck 2005). I argue here that the uniform interpretation 
and enforcement of Islamic investing in Malaysia is created by a transformation of the market’s 
structure, specifically the institutionalized role of the Syariah Advisory Council as a quasi-
governmental body in concert with the Securities Commission. This has resulted in an 
unambiguous bifurcation of listed corporations as either “Syariah-compliant” or “non-
compliant,” accompanied by unambiguous rules to determine the investment universe for money 
managers with Islamic mandates. As a consequence, Islamic principles influence the behavior of 
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listed corporations in Malaysia, at present narrowly, with the potential for wider influence in 
future. 
 Like the Socially Responsible Investment movement in the United States, in Islamic 
finance there is no universal ethical thresholds or uniform operationalization of Shariah 
principles. Fragmentation of Shariah interpretation exists not only at the level of differing 
traditions in Islamic jurisprudence (Warde 2000: 15-17, 32-37) and competing applied and 
academic standard-setting organizations,13 but also at the level of individual financial firms with 
each having its own board of Shariah advisors (see also IOSCO 2004:64-65). This has produced 
fragmentation of interpretation and operationalization of Shariah principles and periodic public 
distrust of Shariah advisors’ independence from their paymasters as well as accusations of 
leniency of interpretation in favor of their paymasters (Iqbal and Molyneux 2005: 105-106, 109; 
Kahf 2004; Warde 2000: 226-230). 
 In contrast to SRI and non-financial mandates, all of which are primarily defined, 
operationalized and audited by individual asset management firms, the Malaysian government 
has created a national Syariah Advisory Council (SAC) to advise the Central Bank (Bank 
Negara) and the regulatory authority of the stock exchange (the Securities Commission, 
Suruhanjaya Sekuriti). Twice per year the SAC produces a list of Syariah-compliant securities in 
the Malaysian capital market, highlighting corporations added or removed from the previous list. 
As an institution, the SAC is unique amongst large Islamic capital markets (IOSCO 2004: 64-65) 
and enjoys support by its national government and legitimacy from the public.14 This is a 
significant difference in market structure between Malaysia and other centers of Islamic Finance 
in that, 1. the potential universe of ethical corporations is centrally determined and listed by a 
national body, and 2. this body is aligned with the national regulatory authority and is therefore 
able to require corporations to provide uniform documentation of whether they meet ethical 
criteria. 
 As a consequence, in contrast to financial mandates in Malaysia or to financial and SRI 
mandates in the United States, the definition of which corporations are Syariah-compliant is 
uniform across Malaysian asset management firms and is operationalized within the firms as a 
bright-line constraint, as a true mandate in the economic perspective and as a social contract that 
strictly constrains the behavior of money managers. For example, in Malaysia, to be Syariah-
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compliant, the SAC requires that a corporation have a positive public image and engage in core 
activities that are beneficial to both the Muslim community and to the country (Securities 
Commission 2005). Like SRI, percentage limits of acceptable involvement are set in 
unacceptable industries. For example, such corporations may also generate up to 5 per cent of 
their turnover and profit in clearly prohibited activities such as earning interest, gambling, liquor 
or pork. There are also 10 per cent thresholds for prohibited activities that Malaysian society 
finds difficult to avoid such as tobacco. Finally, there is a 25 percent threshold for lines of 
business that involve activities that are deemed non-permissible. For example, hotel and resort 
operations often involve non-permissive activities, such as mixed-sex massage or swimming 
pools, such that a Syariah-compliant corporation can only generate up to a quarter of its profit or 
turnover by owning or operating a hotel or resort (Securities Commission 2005). 
 Thus in Malaysia, in contrast to mandate terms like “growth” or “income,” and in contrast 
to Shariah-compliance in most other countries in the world, including in the United States, 
money managers in Malaysia work with a uniform definition of “Syariah-compliance” and a 
uniform list of corporations in their universe of strategic decision-making. In 2006, Syariah-
compliant corporations constituted approximately 63 per cent of total market capitalization. As 
of May 2006 this universe of 871 securities constituted 85 per cent of listings on the Malaysian 
stock market (Securities Commission 2006b: 18). The pragmatic standards of Syariah-
compliance are therefore, in practice, not too distant from current corporate economic practices 
in Malaysia. Nevertheless, due to Malaysia’s historic legacy of Chinese capitalists and its current 
multiethnic and multireligious form, a large percentage of these Syariah-compliant corporations 
are run by non-Muslims and without any religious corporate identity or mission. 
 The potential power of the Islamic Capital Market on corporate behavior in Malaysia can 
be understood by examining the SAC’s recommendations for firms that lose their Syariah-
compliance status. The SAC (Securities Commission 2006a: 10), like any investment manager, 
uses boilerplate language such as: “[t]his document does not constitute a recommendation to buy 
or sell the listed Syariah-compliant securities by the Securities Commission’s Syariah Advisory 
Council.”  Nevertheless in the same document five pages later, they unequivocally state that in 
the case of the 14 Syariah-compliant corporations that were recategorized as “Syariah-non 
compliant securities,” “[t]he SAC advises investors who invest based on Syariah principles to 
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dispose of any Syariah-non compliant securities which they presently hold, within a month of 
knowing the status of the securities” (Securities Commission 2006a: 15). Every fund managers I 
interviewed with an Islamic portfolio is required by his or her firm to completely disinvest in any 
corporation that loses its Syariah-compliant status.  
   What influence, if any, does this coherent and uniform vision of Islamic investing have 
on corporate behavior in Malaysia? Islamic principles influence the behavior of corporations 
listed in Malaysia, at present narrowly, but with the potential for wider influence in future. 
In 2006, regulators and Islamic fund managers did not believe that there is an ‘Islamic 
premium’ for corporations that behave according to Islamic principles nor that there is a ‘penalty’ 
for non-Syariah compliant corporations. This is because, at present, the size of funds invested in 
the Malaysian stock market under an Islamic mandate is small relative to the size of the entire 
market. When a corporation loses its Syariah-compliant status, Islamic funds are required to 
wholly sell their corporate shares, but there are sufficient investors to purchase it so that share 
prices are not affected in the medium-term. 
One important influence on corporate behavior, however, was noted by regulators in the 
Securities Commission and by members of the Syariah Advisory Council. Syariah-compliant 
corporations are required to earn no more than 5 per cent of turnover or profits before tax from 
interest income. Corporations with funds stored in the conventional banking system can easily 
find themselves in violation of this single criteria for maintaining their Syariah-compliant status.  
The solution is logistically simple and potentially profitable – to move funds from the 
conventional banking system to the Islamic banking system. As a consequence, at present the 
single notable influence on corporate behavior of the Syariah Advisory Council’s uniform 
definition of Syariah-compliance appears to be a steady pressure for Malaysian corporations to 
withdraw savings from the conventional banking system and to increase savings in the Islamic 
banking system. 
 Two potentially reversible trends suggest that Islamic Finance may have a larger 
influence on Malaysian corporations’ behavior in future. Firstly, as the size of the Islamic 
banking system grows relative to the conventional banking system, the pool of funds invested 
under an Islamic mandate will also grow. This will make stock market prices increasingly 
sensitive to whether corporations’ behavior meets Islamic criteria. Secondly, the federal 
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government, the largest investor in the Malaysian capital market, is under pressure to 
increasingly invest using Islamic criteria. The federal government is either directly or indirectly 
responsible for the investment of funds under a forced savings scheme for all workers (the 
Employee Provident Fund) as well as the management of optional savings and pension schemes 
designed to redress racial inequalities in economic growth (e.g. Permodalan Nasional Berhad). 
At present, with the exception of a few state governments, these funds can be invested in any 
corporation with the exception of those involved in alcohol, gambling, and (sometimes) tobacco. 
Malaysian money managers of these funds describe this mandate as ‘ethical’ rather than Islamic – 
a weaker set of non-financial constraints on their decision-making disconnected from the Syariah 
Advisory Council. There are conflicting political pressures on the government both to maximize 
its returns for its citizen-investors as well as to invest according to a wide range of political 
criteria. Although Malaysia is a multiethnic and multireligious country, the state is under some 
pressure by Malay nationalism, the dakwah movement and pan-Islamism, to increasingly invest 
according to Islamic criteria, as operationalized by the SAC (see also Abdul Razak Baginda and 
Schier 2002; Gomez and Jomo 1999). 
 In future, if government and government-linked funds are increasingly invested under an 
Islamic mandate, and/or as the Islamic banking system grows relative to the size of the 
conventional banking system, stock market prices will grow increasingly sensitive to whether a 
corporation’s behavior meets Syariah-compliance. The stock market prices of Syariah-compliant 
corporations may increasingly have an ‘Islamic premium’ while non-compliant corporations may 
absorb a ‘penalty.’ For non-compliant corporations, there are numerous potential consequences 
of this. These include a decline in the ‘paper’ wealth of managers holding stock, a decline in the 
corporation’s capacity to acquire loans by using its stock as collateral, a decrease in investors’ 
and/or consumers’ confidence in the corporation and an increase in the corporation’s cost of 
future financing (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 2001). Corporate boards of directors therefore have 
numerous personal and professional interests in sustaining their corporations’ stock market 
prices. In future, Malaysian corporations that are listed as Syariah-compliant, regardless of the 
religious make-up of the corporation’s board of directors or management, may have an increasing 
material interest in maintaining their corporation’s categorization as Syariah-compliant by 
avoiding corporate behavior that the SAC may regard as contrary to Islamic principles. 
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Conclusion 
 In this Chapter, I have argued that the investment mandates to which clients subscribe in 
order to constrain money managers’ behavior are, at best, a weak constraint. Because clients have 
an ‘implicit mandate’ of making money and due to clients’ reliance on money managers to 
interpret whether this is achieved, what the mandate is, and whether the mandate is being 
enacted, I prefer to view mandates as a marketing exercise to attract funds, as well as a social 
construction coproduced by money managers and their clients in an asymmetrical relationship to 
ease the cognitive and organizational tasks of the former. The weakness of mandates as a guide 
to money managers’ investment and disinvestment behavior is a partial explanation for the 
failure of Socially Responsible Investing in the United States to reflect investors’ interest in 
ethical constraints, as well as to reflect their ethical criteria. In the U.S., in 2006, approximately 
only  $7.00 in every $100.00 was invested according to ‘ethical criteria,’ and these ethical criteria 
were diverse and often contradictory, thereby decreasing any potential for this small segment of 
investors to influence corporate behavior. 
 In most of the world’s stock markets with an Islamic capital market (including the United 
States), money managed using Islamic criteria is treated like any other mandate; the 
specifications and the day-to-day operationalization of the mandate’s principles vary by asset 
management firm. In Malaysia, in contrast, due to global and national Islamic finance social 
movements, there has been a single quasi-governmental body (the Syariah Advisory Council) 
associated with the national stock market regulators that twice per year updates a list of which 
corporations are Syariah-compliant (that is, not violating Islamic criteria of ethical investment) 
and non-Syariah-compliant. This nation-wide coordinating mechanism has created a bifurcation 
of the stock market into a large Syariah-compliant segment and a relatively smaller non-Syariah-
compliant segment with fewer potential investors. If a Malaysian corporation is recategorized by 
the Syariah Advisory Council from Syariah-compliant to non-Syariah-compliant, fund managers 
with Islamic mandates are required to sell the corporation. At this point in time, the size of 
Islamic funds is not sufficiently large to create material incentives for corporate management, 
regardless of their religious affiliation, to maintain their Syariah-compliant status by avoiding 
corporate behaviors at odds with Islamic principles. The one significant exception to this is a 
pressure on Syariah-compliant corporations to move their surplus funds to the Islamic banking 
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system from the conventional banking system. In future, if Malaysia’s Islamic banking system 
continues to grow as a percentage of the finance industry, and/or if popular or political pressure 
requires the federal government to invest its substantial funds under an Islamic mandate, 
Malaysian corporations will grow under increasing pressure to behave according to Islamic 
criteria, as written and judged by the Syariah Advisory Council. 
 In conclusion, ethical investing has a potentially large influence on corporate behavior.  
Drawing on ethnographic interview evidence of the ways that money managers make their 
investment and disinvestment decisions, as well as the academic literature on money managers’ 
behavior in the United States, I suggest that a social movement promoting ethical investment is 
insufficient to alter corporate behavior. However, as observed in Malaysia, if the social 
movement puts pressure on the government to alter the market structure of the stock exchange so 
that a common ethical standard and common interpretation of that standard is provided to the 
capital market (in Malaysia, this is the Syariah Advisory Council), stock market prices can be 
socially constructed to be sensitive to corporations’ ethical behavior.  In Malaysia, this acts as a 
guide to corporate behavior in compliance with the ethical criteria set out and interpreted by the 
Syariah Advisory Council. In other countries’ stock markets, the ethical regulations could be 
non-religious and shaped by the national regulatory authority, just as current financial regulations 
are designed to shape corporate behavior. 
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Notes 
1. MMA, a financial services company, was formerly known as Mennonite Mutual Aid.  Note 
that in contrast to MMA 2003's title, the report’s data is a random sample that includes 
respondents that do not self-identify as religious or spiritual. 
2. In the MMA survey of investors’ concerns, on a 5-point scale in which 5 is “very likely to 
avoid investing” and 1 is “not likely to avoid investing,” sweatshops, product safety, high 
executive compensation, and environment respectively received 4.0, 3.9, 3.8, and 3.6. 
3. This ranking is based on the total net assets of funds without a mandate to invest in one or 
more social criteria. For example, the two highest ranked social screens were Tobacco and 
Alcohol, suggesting that these are the most common social constraints on investment (used 
singly or in combination with other criteria) in SRI funds. 
4. Note that the 1/3 figure and the 7 per cent figure are not strictly comparable because not all 
investors have equal wealth or make equally large investments in the stock market. Nevertheless 
this comparison does provide an indication of a significant gap between investors’ preferences 
and existing investment behavior. 
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5. I suggest that this influence is “weak” because shareholders have very little influence over 
U.S. corporate behavior in Annual General Meetings. Arguably the influence is larger for large 
investors who capture a seat on the Board of Directors—although to gain a seat also requires 
extra-democratic persuasion (Bogle 2005; Sobering 1981). Were we to include shareholder 
activism in our definition of SRI, the number of dollars invested would rise to almost $10 in 
every $100.00 under professional management (Social Investment Forum 2006). 
6. The 15.3 per cent back-of-the-envelope calculations are based on Malaysian data (e.g.,  Bank 
Negara 2006 and Securities Commission 2006b) and the Social Investment Forum’s (2006: 2, 
38-39) definition of social investment. Specifically, since 8 per cent of all unit trust (pension) 
funds are Syariah-compliant (Securities Commission 2006b), and RM98,484.89 million is held 
in unit trusts, then approximately RM7878.79 million is managed in Syariah-based unit trusts. 
An additional RM7790.47 million is managed by the Employee Provident Fund which my 
interviewees report is managed using “ethical criteria” (see main text for a Malaysia-specific 
definition distinct from Islamic Finance). An additional RM3341.97 million is managed by 
diverse government agencies and government bodies which my interviewees report is managed 
according to clients’ criteria, which is typically Islamic or ethical criteria. This totals to 
RM19011.33 million total funds managed using Islamic or ethical criteria out of RM124,162.65 
million total funds managed under licensed fund managers (Bank Negara 2006), and therefore 
15.3 per cent. To the degree this estimate based on aggregate data is accurate, it is comparable to 
the survey-based Social Investment Forum (2006) estimate. 
7. This is the correct spelling in Malaysia. This article also uses Shariah, a common 
transliteration in English. 
8. The exceptions are governments that by fiat have required that their entire banking system 
conform to Islamic criteria. In 2004 these are Sudan, Iran and contestably Pakistan (Kahf 2004: 
30-32; Iqbal and Molyneux 2005: 36-71). 
9. Moody’s Investors Service, a credit rating agency, estimates that $300 billion is invested in 
Islamic mutual funds and an additional $250 billion in Islamic banks (IOSCO 2004: 35; Prystay 
2006; Warde 2000: 6). As Warde (2000: 6-9) outlines, such figures are point estimates with wide 
margins of error since a census of Islamic financial institutions is nonexistent and the reporting 
standards in many emerging markets are poor. 
 24 
10. Aysha is a pseudonym, like all interviewees’ names in this article. 
11. I wish to thank Julie Hogeland for debating my original formulation. 
12. For example, consider the aforementioned American Century Heritage Fund that invested 
outside of its mandate in risky Argentine debt. The risk of the Argentine government choosing in 
future not to repay its creditors is real but unobservable unless it occurs.  Prior to the default in 
2001, the American Century Heritage Fund needed not explain to its investors that its high 
returns were in part a function of their decision to purchase such risky debt. After the default, the 
fund lost investors’ money and the fund could interpret this poor performance as a consequence 
of a rare and risky event.” 
13. The two primary standard-setting bodies is the Islamic Fiqh Academy and the International 
Association of Islamic Banks (Henry and Wilson 2004: 5; Iqbal and Molyneux 2005: 108; Warde 
2000: 229). Arguably such standard-setting has increasingly fragmented in recent years as 
academic Islamic finance research institutes create new interpretations of Shariah principles 
outside of the “new power alliance” (Kahf 2004) of Shariah religious scholars and financial 
industry economists. 
14. In 2004 the only other countries with Shariah certification conducted by national regulators 
was Indonesia, Sudan and Pakistan (IOSCO 2004: 64-65). None of these countries in 2004 had 
an economically significant stock market relative to the size of their respective national 
economies. 
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